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1. Introduction 
Predictability evolves. The relation between our models and reality is one of similarity, not isomorphism, 
and predictability takes form only within the context of our models. Thus predictability is a function of our 
understanding, our technology and our dedication to the task. The imperfection of our models implies that 
theoretical limits to predictability in the present may be surpassed; they need not limit predictability in the 
future. How then are we to exploit the probability forecasts extracted from our models, along with 
observations of the single realization corresponding to each forecast, to improve the structure and 
formulation of our models? Can we exploit observations as one agent of a natural selection and happily allow 
our understanding to evolve without any ultimate goal, giving up the common vision of slowly approaching 
the Perfect Model? This talk addresses these questions in a rather applied manner, and it adds a fourth: Might 
the mirage of a Perfect Model actually impede model improvement? 
Given a mathematical dynamical system, a measurement function that translates between states of this 
system and observations, and knowledge of the statistical characteristics of any observational noise, then in 
principle we can quantify predictability quite accurately. But this situation describes the perfect model 
scenario (PMS), not the real world. In the real world we define the predictability of physical systems through 
our mathematical theories and our in silico models. And all our models are wrong: useful but imperfect. This 
talk aims to illustrate the utility of existing ensemble prediction systems, not their imperfections. We will see 
that economic illustrations are of particular value, and investigate the construction of probability forecasts of 
observables from model simulations. General arguments and brief illustrations are given below; 
mathematical details and supporting statistics can be found in the references. While the arguments below are 
often couched in terms of economic users, their implications extend to the ways and means of meteorology 
as a physical science. Just as it is important not to confuse utility with empirical adequacy, it is also 
important to accept both as means of advancing any physical science.  
In the next three sections we make a quick tour of useful background issues in forecasting, economics, and 
predictability. Then in Section 5 we consider the question of comparing forecasts and the notion of “best.”  
This continues in Section 6 with a number of issues at the interface of meteorology and statistics, while 
illustrations of their economic relevance are noted in Section 7. It is quite popular today to blame forecast 
busts on “uncertainty in initial condition” (or chaos), we discuss what this phrase might possibly mean in 
Section 8, before concluding in Section 9. In reality predictability evolves, and as shown in Section 4, “the 
future” evolves even within the mathematical fiction of a perfect model scenario where predictability does 
not.  
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2. Contrasting 1995 and 2002 Perspectives on Predictability 
What has changed in the short time since the 1995 ECMWF Seminar on Predictability? Since I cannot avoid 
indirectly criticising what was happening in 1995, we will focus mostly on my contribution to the seminar. 
A major focus of my 1995 paper was on ensemble formation for systems of chaotic differential equations, in 
contrast this talk does not contain a single differential equation. In fact, it contains only one equation and, as 
it turns out, that equation is ill-posed. The 1995 paper focuses on constructing perfect ensembles, while 
below we will be more concerned with interpreting operational ensembles.  The 1995 paper quantifies the 
difference between some forecast probability density function (PDF) and a perfect PDF obtained by 
propagating current uncertainty forward in time under a perfect model, while below I am content to discuss 
how to change an ensemble of simulations into a PDF forecast in the first place. There is also a question as to 
how one should evaluate any forecast PDF, given that we never have access to the “perfect PDF”, if such a 
thing exists, but only observations of a single realization of weather. That is, we have only measurements of 
the one thing that happened, a target often called the verification. In general, it seems to me that the 1995 
paper focuses on doing maths within the perfect model scenario (PMS), whereas the current paper is more 
interested in quantifying information content and debating resource allocation.  
In 1995 we discussed quantifying model error, while now I have been reduced to pondering model error, 
which I now refer to as model inadequacy (following Kennedy and O’Hagan, 2001).  Any particular model 
can be thought of as one member of a model class. As a very simple example, consider different models that 
share the same structural form but have different parameter values, these are in the same model class; or 
consider the collection of all one-dimensional maps consisting of finite-order polynomials. Model 
inadequacy reflects the fact that not only is the best model we have imperfect, but there is no member of the 
known model class which is perfect. This is a much deeper flaw than having incorrect parameter values: in 
this case there are no “Correct” parameter values to be had. And this case is ubiquitous within physical 
science. 
The concept of i-shadowing was introduced in 1995, as was the notion of an accountable probability 
forecast. A model is said to i-shadow over a given period in time if there exists a model trajectory that is 
consistent with the observations, given the observational noise, over that period. For historical reasons, 
meteorologists call the model state that corresponds to the operational best guess of current atmospheric 
conditions the analysis. The question of quantifying just how long operational models can shadow either the 
observations or even the corresponding time series of analyses remains of key interest. The notion of an 
accountable ensemble forecast was also introduced in the 1995 Seminar (see also Smith, 2000) as a 
generalization of Popper’s idea of accountability in the single forecast scenario. Popper  (1956) realised that 
forecasts would fail due to uncertainty in the initial condition even if the model was perfect; he called a 
model accountable if it correctly specified the accuracy of measurement required to obtain a given forecast 
accuracy. For an accountable ensemble forecast the size of the ensemble will accurately reflect the resolution 
of the probability forecast.  The relevant point here is that any forecast product extracted from an 
accountable probability forecast will suffer only from the fact that the forecast ensemble has a finite number 
of members: we could never reject the null hypothesis that both the members of the forecast ensemble and 
the verification (“Truth”) were drawn from the same distribution. 
The distribution of shadowing times is arguably the best measure we have for contrasting various nonlinear 
models and quantifying the relevance of uncertainty in the initial condition (as opposed to model 
inadequacy).  I hope that in the pages that follow, the distinction between methods which reflect the quality 
of a simulation model (i.e. shadowing times) are clearly distinguished from methods which reflect the quality 
of a complete probability forecast system (i.e. ignorance as defined in Section 5.5). Recall that with a 
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nonlinear model, a probability forecasting system can only be evaluated as a whole: nonlinearity links data 
assimilation, ensemble formation, model structure and the rest. 
In general, I would identify two major changes in my own work from 1995 to 2002. The first is a shift from 
doing mathematics to doing physics; more specifically, of trying to identify when very interesting 
mathematics is taking us to a level of detail that cannot be justified given the limited ability of our model to 
reflect the phenomena we are modelling.  Indeed, I now believe that model inadequacy prevents accountable 
probability forecasts in a manner not dissimilar to that in which uncertainty in the initial condition precludes 
accurate best first guess (BFG) forecasting in the root-mean-square sense. In fact we may need to replace the 
concept of probability forecasts with something else. The second change reflects a better understanding of 
the role of the forecast user as the true driver for real-time weather forecasting. Economic users can play 
particularly critical roles both as providers of valid empirical targets, the ultimate test of mathematical 
modelling (at least within mathematical physics), and also as a valuable source of data for assimilation. In 
the next section, we will develop an ensemble of users with which to illustrate this interaction.  
3. An Ensemble of Users 
Tim Palmer’s contribution to this volume (Palmer, 2002) introduced his golf buddy, Charlie the contractor. 
Charlie is forced by the nature of his work to make binary decisions, for example whether or not to pour 
concrete on a given afternoon. The weather connection comes in as another binary event: if it freezes then 
the cement will not set properly.  By using cost-loss analysis (Richardson, 2000; Murphy, 1977; Angstrom, 
1919), Charlie can work out the probability threshold for freezing at which he should take the afternoon off 
and go play golf. Of course, if Charlie is presented with a definitive forecast (“The low temperature tonight 
will be 4 degrees C” or “No ground frost tonight”), then pours the concrete and it does freeze, he is likely to 
somewhat disappointed. As Tim noted, he may look for someone to sue.  There are, of course, no definitive 
forecasts and to sell any forecast as unequivocal is to invite lawsuits. When a forecaster has foreknowledge 
of the uncertainty of a forecast and yet still presents an unequivocal forecast to the public, justifying it as 
being “for their own good”, she is inviting such a law suit. Arguably, the public has the right to expect a 
frank appraisal of the forecaster’s belief in the forecast. As it turns out, Charlie also plays the horses; he 
knows much about odds. He does not even hold the naïve expectation that the corresponding implied 
“probabilities” (of each horse winning) should sum up to one!  
But there is more to the world than binary decisions (and golf). While I do not know Charlie, at a recent LSE 
alumni dinner I met Charles. Charles now works in the financial futures market; while he no doubt plays 
golf, he does not see himself as making binary decisions; he is interested in “How much” questions rather 
than “Yes or No” questions.  This is because Charles buys and sells large quantities of petroleum products 
(heating oil, gas, various flavours of crude, jet fuel and so on) always being careful not to take delivery of 
any of it. He has also started pricing weather derivatives, a wide variety of weather derivatives in fact. He is 
fluent in stochastic calculus and knows a bit of probability theory, enough to know that in order to gauge his 
risk he wants more than a single probability threshold.  
Charles has an interesting view of what constitutes a good four-week forecast. He doesn’t care at all about 
the average temperature in week four, nor whether the Monday two weeks hence is in fact going to be a very 
cold day.  While Charlie is concerned as to whether or not cement will set tonight, Charles is not concerned 
about any particular day. Instead, Charles is very concerned about the number of days between now and the 
end of the month on which cement will not set, inasmuch as this is the kind of variable that weather 
derivatives near expiry might be based upon. Charles knows how to place his bets given a good probability 
forecast; his question is whether a given probability forecast is a good one! For better or for worse, one of the 
advantages of providing a probability forecast is that no single probability forecast need ever be judged 
“wrong”; finding oneself overly worried about what might happen in any one forecast suggests we have not 
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fully accepted the paradigm. Nevertheless, if Charles only bets when the forecast probability of winning is 
over 90% and, after many bets, he finds he has won only half the time, then he will have a strong case 
against the forecast vendor.  
The financial markets are inundated with vendors of various forecasts, and Charles is familiar with forecasts 
that fail to provide value. He already knows how to sue, of course, but never does so; life is too short.  
Rather, he relies on natural selection in the market place: if the forecasts do not contain the information he 
needs, or are not presented in a manner such that he can extract that information (even if it is there), then he 
simply stops buying them and speaks badly of them in London wine bars.  
And then there is Charlotte, another LSE graduate now working in the energy sector. Charlotte’s goal is not 
to make money  per se, but rather to generate electricity as efficiently as possible, using a mix of wind power 
along side a set of combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) generators1. Her definition of “efficiently” is an 
economic one, but includes issues of increasing air quality and decreasing carbon dioxide production. 
Ideally, she wants a forecast, which includes the full probability density function (PDF) of future 
atmospheric states, or at least the PDF for temperature, pressure, wind speed and humidity at a few dozen 
points on the surface of the Earth. And she would like to forecast weather dependence of demand as well, 
especially where it is sensitive to variables that also impact the efficiency of generation. The alternative of 
using only marginal distributions, or perhaps a bounding box (Smith, 2001;  Judd, Smith and Weisheimer, 
2003), may prove an operational alternative. But Charlotte’s aim is not to be perfect but rather simply to do 
better, so she is happy to focus on a single site if that is required by the limited information content in the 
forecast. 
A quick calculation2 shows that, even with an accountable forecast the ensemble size required in order to 
resolve conditional probabilities will remain prohibitive for quite some time.  Of course, the future may 
allow flow-dependent resource allocation, including the distribution of ensemble members over the GRID on 
those days when such resource is justified. A somewhat longer and rather more dubious calculation suggests 
that generating this style of weather forecasting might feedback on the weather which is being forecast. 
Certainly the effect  would far exceed that of the flapping of a butterfly’s wing, unless the forecasters were 
re-located to some remote location, say, on the moon. 
Like Charles, Charlotte is also interested in the number of cold days in the remainder of this month, or this 
season. This is especially true if they are likely to be consecutive cold days.  The consumption of natural gas, 
and hence its price, depends on such things. And it is impossible to deduce them from knowing that there is a 
10% chance of a cold day on four consecutive days in week two: thinking of the ensemble members as 
scenarios, Charlotte wants to know whether that 10% is composed of the same ensemble members each day 
(in which case there is a 10% chance of a 4 day cold spell) or whether it was the case that 10% of the total 
ensemble was cold on each of the four days, but the cold temperatures corresponded to different members 
each day, in which case the chance of  an extended cold spell could be very very low (depending on the size 
of the ensemble).   
                                                     
1 The use of CCGT generators comes from the fact that their efficiency in converting fuel to electricity varies with 
temperature, pressure and humidity; any generation method with weather dependent efficiency would suffice here. 
2 The construction of state-dependent conditional probability distributions from ensembles requires having enough 
members to estimate a distribution of the n+1st variable, given particular values of the first n variables. This is just 
another guise of the curse of dimensionality, made worse both by the need for a distribution of the target variable and 
by Charlotte’s particular interest in the tails of  (each of the many distinct conditional) distributions. 
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Why does she care about the four consecutive cold days problem? By law (of Parliament), natural gas will be 
diverted from industrial users to domestic users in times of high demand. If she can see that there is a 
moderate probability of such a period in advance, she can fill her reserve tanks before the start of the cold 
spell (and take a forward position in gas and electricity markets as well). This is a fairly low cost action, 
because if the cold spell fails to materialise, she can simply decrease purchase of natural gas next week. The 
carrying costs of an early purchase are small, the profit loss of running low is huge: she is happy to overstock 
several times a year, in order to have full reserves during the cold spells that do occur. 
And she can mix this weather information in with a variety of other indicators and actions; from scheduling 
(or postponing) preventive maintenance, to allowing optional leave of absence, so as to embed probabilistic 
weather information naturally into a scheme of seamless forward planning. 
Cost functions targeting Charles’ and Charlotte’s desires could prove very valuable to modellers; inasmuch 
as we have not already fit our models to such targets, they provide a fresh viewpoint from which we can 
detect hidden shortcomings of our models. But even beyond this, Charlotte and her colleagues are not only 
collecting traditional meteorological observations at various points scattered about the country (power station 
locations), they also collect real time data on weather related demand integrated over spatial regions 
comparable with the grid resolution of a weather model and on time scales of seconds: the assimilation of 
such observations might also prove of value. 
Charlie, Charles and Charlotte each aim to extract as much relevant information as possible from the 
forecast, but no more. Each of them realise that, in the past, weather forecasts have been presented as if they 
contained much more information than even a casual verification analysis would support. The five-day 
forecasts for Oxford at www.metoffice.com, present the day five forecast with the same air of authority 
given to the day two forecast. The Weather Channel, which provides 10-day point forecasts at 
www.weather.com, and other vendors are concerned to present the uncertainty they know is associated with 
their current apparently unequivocal forecasts. Yet a decade after ensemble forecasting became operational, 
it is still not clear how to do so. And the situation is getting worse: there is talk of commercially available 
point forecasts out to 364 days, each lead-time presented as if it were as reliable as any other (in this last 
case, no doubt, the vast majority are equally reliable). Questions of how to best communicate uncertainty 
information to numerate users and how to rapidly communicate forecast uncertainty to the general public are 
central to programs like THORPEX. Answering these questions will require improving the research interface 
between social psychology, meteorology and mathematics. Our current progress in this direction can be 
observed in the forecasts posted at www.dime.lse.ac.uk. 
So we now have our ensemble of three users, each with similar but distinct interests in weather forecasts and 
different resources available to evaluate forecast information. Charlie is primarily interested in binary 
choices. Charles’ main interests lie both in a handful of meteorological standards  (where he cares only what 
the legal value of the standard was, not what the weather was) and in very broad meteorologically influenced 
demand levels. Charlotte is interested in accurate, empirically falsifiable forecasts; she doesn’t care what the 
analysis was or what the official temperature at Heathrow was.  She has temperature records of her own in 
addition to measurements of  the efficiency of her CCGT generators and wind turbines. In a very real sense, 
her “economic variables” are more “physical” than any model-laden variable intended to reflect the 500 mb 
pressure height field within the model’s analysis.  
There are, of course, important societal uses of weather forecasts beyond economics; many of these societal 
applications are complicated by the fact that the psychological reactions figure into the effectiveness of the 
forecast (for an example, see Roulston and Smith, 2003b). For most of what follows, however, we will 
consider weather forecasts from the varying viewpoints of Charlie, Charles, and Charlotte. Obviously, I aim 
to illustrate how probability forecasts derived from operational ensemble prediction systems (EPS) compare, 
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in terms of economic relevance, with forecasts derived from a best first guess (BFG) approach, and we shall 
see that probability forecasts are more physically relevant as well. But I will also argue that accountable 
probability forecasts may well lie forever beyond our grasp, and that we must be careful not to mislead our 
“users” or ourselves in this respect.  To motivate this argument, we will first contrast the Laplacian view of 
predictability with a 21st century view that accounts for uncertainty in the initial condition, if not model 
inadequacy. 
4. Contrasting 19th vs. 21st Century Perspectives on Predictability 
Imagine (for a moment) an intelligence that knew the True Laws of Nature and had accurate but not exact 
observations of a chaotic system extending over an arbitrarily long time. Such an agent, even if sufficiently 
powerful to subject all this data to (exact) mathematical analysis, could not determine the current state of the 
system and thus the present, as well as the future, would remain uncertain in her eyes. Yet the future would 
hold no surprises for her, she could make accountable probability forecasts, and low probability events 
would occur only as frequently as expected. The degree of perfection that meteorologists have been able to 
give ensemble weather forecasting reflects their aim to approximate the intelligence we have just imagined, 
although we will forever remain infinitely remote from such intelligence.3 
It is important to distinguish determinism and predictability (see Earman, 1986; Bishop, 2003 and the 
references therein). Using the notion of indistinguishable states (Judd and Smith, 2001) we can illustrate this 
distinction with our 21st century demon, which has a perfect model and infinite computational capacity but 
access to only finite resolution observations. If the model is chaotic, then we can prove that, in addition to 
the “True” state, there exists a set of states that are indistinguishable from the particular trajectory that 
actually generated the data. More precisely, we have shown that given many realizations of the observational 
noise, there is not one but, in each case, a collection of trajectories that cannot be distinguished from the 
“True” trajectory given only the observations. The system is deterministic, the future trajectory of each state 
is well defined and unique, but uncertainty in the initial condition limits even the demon’s prediction to the 
provision of probability distributions. 
Note that the notion of shadowing is distinct from that of indistinguishable states (or indistinguishable 
trajectories). i-shadowing contrasts a trajectory of our mathematical model with a time series of targets 
usually based on observations of some physical system. This is often cast as a question of existence: does the 
model admit one or more trajectories that are consistent with the time series of observations given the noise? 
The key point here is that we are contrasting our model with the observations. This is very different from the 
case of indistinguishable states, where we are contrasting various model trajectories with each other and 
asking whether or not we are likely to be able to distinguish one from another given only noisy observations. 
In this case, one considers all possible realizations of the observational noise. Thus when working with 
indistinguishable states we consider model trajectories and the statistics of the observational noise, whereas 
with shadowing we contrast a model trajectory and the actual set of observations in hand. Shadowing has a 
long history in nonlinear dynamical systems dating back to the early 1960’s; a discussion of the various casts 
of shadow can be found in Smith (2001). 
Given the arguments above, it follows that within the perfect model scenario an infinite number of distinct, 
infinitely long shadowing model trajectories would exist, each trajectory shadowing observations from the 
beginning of time up until the present. These trajectories are easily distinguished from each other within the 
                                                     
3 After Laplace, see Nagel (1961). Note that the distinction between uncertainty in initial conditions and model 
inadequacy was clear to Laplace (although perhaps not to Bayes), who distinguished uncertainty of the current state of 
the universe from “ignorance of true causes”. 
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model state space, but the noisy observations do not contain enough information to identify which one was 
used to generate the data. The contents of this set of indistinguishable states will depend on the particular 
realization of the observational noise, but the set will always include the generating trajectory (also known as 
“Truth”). This fact implies that even if granted all the powers of our 21st century demon, we would still have 
to make probability forecasts. Epistemologically, one could argue that the “true state” of the system is simply 
not defined at this point in time, and that the future is no more than a probability distribution. Accepting this 
argument implies that after each new observation is made, the future really ain’t what it used to be. 
Of course, even this restriction to an ever-changing probabilistic future is a difficulty to which we can only 
aspire. We do not have a perfect model; we do not even have a perfect model class, meaning that there is no 
combination of model parameters (or available parameterisations) for which any model accessible to us will 
provide a shadowing trajectory.  Outside the perfect model scenario (PMS), the set of indistinguishable states 
tends to the empty set (Judd and Smith, 2003). In other words, the probability that the data was generated 
from any model in the model class approaches zero as we collect more observations, an awkward fact for the 
applied Bayesian. But accepting this fact allows us to stop aiming for the perfect model, just as accepting 
uncertainty in the initial condition freed us from the unattainable goal of a single accurate prediction from 
inaccurate starting conditions. When the model is very good (that is, the typical i-shadowing times are long 
compared to the forecast time) then the consideration of indistinguishable states suggests a new approach to 
several old questions.  
5. Indistinguishable States and the Fair Valuation of Forecasts 
In this section we will consider the aims of model building and the evaluation of ensemble forecasts. Rather 
than repeat arguments in Smith (1997, 2001) on the importance of distinguishing model-variables from 
observed variables, we will consider the related question of the “best” parameter value for a given model 
class. Arguably there is no such thing outside of PMS, and the insistence on finding a best can degrade 
forecast performance.  We will then consider the game of weather roulette, and its use as an illustration for 
the economic decisions Charles and Charlotte make everyday. A fair comparison of the value of different 
forecasts requires contrasting like with like, for example we must “dress” both BFG and EPS simulations in 
order to obtain a fair evaluation of the probability forecasts available from each method. Weather roulette 
also allows us to illustrate Charles’ favored cost function for economic forecasts, the logarithmic skill score 
called ignorance (Roulston and Smith, 2002). Relative ignorance can also be used to obtain insight on 
operational questions such as the division of computational resource between ensemble size and model 
resolution for a given target, as illustrated with Heathrow temperatures below (see also Smith, et al. 2001). 
Two worked economic examples are discussed in Section 7. 
5.1 Against Best 
What parameter values should best be used in a forecast model? If the system that is generating the data 
corresponds to a particular set of parameters in our forecast model, then we have a perfect model class; 
obviously that set of parameters would be a candidate for “best.” Outside PMS, at least, the question of best 
cannot be decoupled from the question of why we are building the model. We will duck both questions, and 
simply consider a single physically well-understood parameter, the freezing point of water4, within three 
(imperfect) modelling scenarios. 
                                                     
4 This section has generated such varied and voluminous feedback that I am loath to alter it at all. A few things might be 
clarified in this footnote. First I realise that ground frost may occur when the 2 metre temperature is well above zero, 
that the freezing point of fresh water might be less relevant to the Earth-System than the freezing point of sea water, and 
(I’ve learned) that the freezing point of deliquescent haze is quite variable. Yet each of these variables is amenable to 
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At standard pressure, it is widely accepted that liquid water freezes at zero degrees C. In a weather model 
with one millimetre resolution, I would be quick to assign this value to the model-freezing point. In a 
weather model with one-Angstrom resolution, I would hope the value of zero degrees C would “emerge” 
from the model all by itself. And at 40 kilometre resolution? Well at 40km resolution I have no real clue as 
to the relation between model-temperature and temperature. I see no defensible argument for setting this 
parameter to anything other than that value which yields the best distribution of shadowing trajectories (that 
is, the distribution which, in some sense, reflects the longest shadowing times; a definition we will avoid 
here). This confusion between model-parameters and their physical analogues, or even better between 
model-variables and the observations (direct empirical measurements) is common. The situation is not 
helped by the fact that both are often given the same name; to clarify this we will distinguish between 
temperature and model-temperature where needs be.  
Translating between model variables and observables is also related to representativity error. Here we simply 
note that representativity error is a shortcoming of the model (and the model-variables) not the observations. 
In ten years time the temperature observations recorded today at Heathrow airport will still be important bits, 
whereas no one will care about model-temperature at today’s effective grid resolution. It is the data, not the 
model-state space, that endures. 
Outside PMS, it is not clear how to relate model-variables to variables. To be fair, one should allow each 
model its own projection operator. Discussion of the difficulties this introduces will be pursued elsewhere, 
but there is no reason to assume that this operator should be one-to-one; it is likely to be one-to-many, as one 
model state almost surely corresponds to many atmospheric states if it corresponds to any. It may even be the 
case that there are many atmospheric states for each model state, and that each atmospheric state corresponds 
to more than one model state: a many-to-many map.  But again, note that it might be best to avoid the 
assumption that there is “an” atmospheric state altogether. We do not require this assumption. All we ever 
have are model states and integer observations. 
5.2 Model Inadequacy: The Biggest Picture 
Let us now reconsider the issues of forecasting within the big picture. Once again, suppose for the moment 
that there exists some True state of the atmosphere, call it X(t). This is the kind of thing Laplace’s 19th 
century demon would need to know to make perfect forecasts, and given   X (t) perfect BFG forecasts would 
follow even if the system were chaotic. As Laplace noted, mere mortals can never know X, rather we make 
direct measurements (that is, observations) s, which correspond to some projection of X into the space of our 
observing system. Given s, and most-likely employing our model M as well, we project all the observations 
we have into our model-state space to find x(t), a model state often called the analysis, along with some 
uncertainty information regarding the accuracy of this state. This is nothing more than data assimilation. 
Using our model, we then iterate x(t) forward in time to some future state, where we reverse the process (via 
                                                                                                                                                                                
physical measurement; my point is simply that their 40 km resolution model-variable namesakes are not, except 
inasmuch as they affect the model trajectories. Granted, in the lab “zero degrees C” may be argued exact by definition, 
any reader distracted by this fact should read the phrase as “32 degrees F” throughout. I am also well aware that the 
value given to one parameter will affect others, but I would avoid the suggestion that “two wrongs make a right”: 
outside PMS there is no “right”. Whenever different combinations of parameter values shadow, then we should keep 
(sample) all such combinations until such time as we can distinguish between them given the observations. This is one 
reason why I wish to avoid, as far as possible, the notion of shadowing anything other than the observations themselves, 
since comparisons with averages and the like might yield the “two wrongs” without the  “better”. Lastly I realise that it 
is always possible that out-of-sample, the parameters may fail to yield a reasonable forecast however they have been 
tuned: all forecasts must be interpreted within the rosy scenario, as discussed in Smith (2002). 
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downscaling or model output statistics) to extract some observable w. In the mean time, the atmosphere has 
evolved itself to a new state, and we compare our forecast of w with the corresponding observed projection 
from the new X. 
Although pictures similar to the one drawn in the preceding paragraph are commonplace, the existence of 
Truth, that is the existence of X, is mere hypothesis. We have no need of that hypothesis, regardless of how 
beautiful it is. All we ever have access to are the observations, which are mere numbers.  The existence of 
some “true” atmospheric state, much less some mathematically perfect model under which it evolves, is 
untestable. While such questions of belief are no doubt of interest to philosophers and psychologists, can 
they play a central role within science itself? In questions of resource allocation and problem selection, they 
do.  
Accepting that there is no perfect model is a liberating process; perhaps more importantly, it might allow 
better forecasts of the real atmosphere. Doing so can impact our goals in model improvement, for example, 
by suggesting the use of ensembles of models and improving their utility, as opposed to exploring 
mathematical approximations which will prove valid only for some even better model which, supposing it 
exists, is currently well beyond our means. The question, of course, is where to draw the line; few would 
question that there is significant information content in the “Laws of Physics” however they lie, yet we have 
no reliable guide for quantifying this information content. In which cases will PMS prove to be a productive 
assumption? And when would we do better by maintaining two (or seven) distinct but plausible model 
structures and not trying to decide which one was best? 
Charles, Charlie, and Charlotte, along with others in the economy rather than economics, seem untroubled by 
these issues; they tend to agree on the same cost function, even if they agree on nothing else. So we will 
leave these philosophical issues for the time being, and turn to the question of making money. 
5.3 Weather Roulette 
A major goal of this talk is to convince you that weather roulette is a not only a reasonable illustration of the 
real-world economic decisions that Charles and Charlotte deal with on a daily basis, but that it also suggests 
a relevant skill score for probabilistic forecast systems. Weather roulette (Roulston and Smith, 2003c) is a 
game in which you bet a fixed stake (or perhaps your entire net worth) on, say, the temperature at Heathrow. 
This is repeated every day. You can place a wager on each number between –5 and 29, where 29 will include 
any temperature greater than 29 and –5 any value below –5. How should you spread your bet? First off, we 
can see that it would be foolish not to put something on each and every possibility, just to be sure that we do 
not go bust. The details of the distribution depend on your attitudes toward risk and luck, among other 
things; we will consider only the first.  In fact we will initially take a risk neutral approach where we believe 
in our forecast probabilities: in this case we distribute our stake proportionally according to the predicted 
probability of each outcome. We imagine ourselves playing against a house that sets probabilistically fair 
odds using a probability distribution different from ours. Using this approach we can test the performance of 
different probability forecast systems in terms of how they fare (either as house or as punter).   
As a first step, let’s contrast how the ECMWF ensemble forecast would perform betting against 
climatological probabilities. Given a sample-climatology based on 17 years of observations, we know the 
relative frequency with which each option has been observed (given many centuries of data, we might know 
this distribution for each day of the year).  But how do we convert an ensemble forecast of about 50 
simulations into a probability forecast for the official observed temperature at Heathrow airport? There are a 
number of issues here. 
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5.4 Comparing like with like 
How can Charlotte contrast the value of two different probability forecasting systems, say one derived from a 
high-resolution BFG forecast and the other from an EPS forecast? or perhaps two EPS forecasts which differ 
either in the ensemble formation method or as to the ensemble size? There are two distinct issues here: how 
to turn simulations into forecasts and how to agree on the verification. 
The first question is how to turn a set of model(s) simulations into a probability weather forecast. In the case 
of ensembles there are at least three options: fitting some parametric distribution to the entire ensemble, or 
dressing the individual ensembles members (each with an appropriate kernel), or treating the entire forecast 
ensemble (and the corresponding verification) as a single point in a higher dimensional space and then 
basing a forecast upon analogues in this product space. We will focus on dressing the ensemble, which treats 
each individual member as a possible scenario. The product space approach treats the statistics of the 
ensemble as a whole, examples in the context of precipitation and wind energy can be found in Roulston et 
al. (2001, 2003). 
Treating the singleton BFG as a point prediction (that is, a delta function) does not properly reflect its value 
in practice.  To obtain a fair comparison with an EPS, we “dress” the forecast values by replacing each value 
with a distribution. For the singleton BFG, one can construct a useful  kernel5 simply by sampling the 
distribution of historical “error” statistics. The larger the archive of past forecasts, the more specific the 
match between simulation and kernel. Obviously we expect a different kernel for each forecast lead-time, but 
seasonal information can also be included if the archive span is long enough. Dressing the BFG in this way 
allows a fair comparison with probability forecasts obtained from ensemble forecasts. If nothing else, doing 
so places the same shortcoming due to counting statistics on each case. To see the unfairness in treating a 
BFG forecast as if it were an ensemble which had forecast the same value 50 times, recall the game of 
roulette. Think of the advantage one would have in playing roulette if, given an accountable probability 
forecast, you could place separate bets with 50 one dollar chips on each game, rather than having to place 
one 50 dollar chip on each game. To make a fair comparison, it is crucial that the single high-resolution 
simulation is dressed and not treated as a definitive forecast.  
Suppose we have in hand a projection operator that takes a single model state into the physical quantity we 
are interested in, in this case the temperature at Heathrow. Each ensemble member could be translated into a 
specific forecast; because the ensemble has a fixed number of members, we will want to dress these delta 
functions to form a probability distribution that accounts both for our finite sample and for the impact of 
model error. We use a best member approach to dressing, which is discussed in Roulston and Smith (2003a).  
Why don’t we dress the ensemble members with the same kernel used for the BFG? 
Because to do so would double count for uncertainty in the initial condition. The only accounting for this 
uncertainty in the BFG is the kernel itself, while the distribution of the ensemble members aims to account 
for some of the uncertainty in the initial condition explicitly. Thus, the other things being equal, the BFG 
kernel is too wide for ensemble members. Which kernel is appropriate for the ensemble members? Just as the 
error in the high-resolution forecast is too wide, the error in the ensemble mean is irrelevant. By using a 
                                                     
5 A kernel is a probability distribution function used to smooth the single value from each simulation, either by 
substituting the kernel itself or by sampling from it (see Roulston and Smith, 2003). Note that different kernels can be 
applied to different ensemble members, as long they can be distinguished without reference to any future verification 
(for example, one would expect the ECMWF EPS control member have a different kernel and be more heavily 
weighted than the perturbation members at short lead times; but even the rank order of members may prove useful at 
longer lead times.)  
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kernel based on the best member of the ensemble, we aim to use a kernel that is as narrow as possible, but 
not more so. We do not, of course, know which member of the ensemble will turn out to provide the best 
forecast, but we do know that one of them will. The necessity of dressing emphasizes the role of the forecast 
archive in the proper valuation validation of EPS forecasts. It also shows that the market value of EPS will 
be diminished if a suitable EPS forecast archive is not maintained. 
The second question of model verification addresses how we come to agree on what actually happened. This 
is not as clear-cut as it might first appear; a cyclist may arrive home drenched only to learn that, officially, it 
had not rained. Often, as in the case of the cyclist, what “happened” is decided by decree: some agency is 
given the power to define what officially happened.  Charles is happy with this scenario as long as the 
process is relatively fair: he wants to close his book at the end of each day and go home. Charlotte may be 
less pleased if the “official” forecast says her generators were running at 77%, while a direct calculation 
based on the amount of gas burned yields 60%. In part, this difference arises because Charles really is 
playing a game, while Charlotte is trying to do something real. Outside the perfect model scenario, there 
appears to be no unique optimal solution. 
5.5 Ignorance 
Roulston and Smith (2002) discuss an information theoretic skill score that reflects expected performance at 
weather roulette. Called ignorance, this skill score reflects the expected wealth doubling time of two 
gamblers betting against each other using probability forecasts, each employing Kelly systems6.  For 
instance, a difference in ignorance scores of one bit per game would suggest that, on average, the players 
with lower ignorance score would double their stake on each iteration. The typical wealth doubling (or 
halving) time of a balanced roulette table is about 25 games, favouring the house, while scientific roulette 
players have claimed a doubling time on the order of 3 and favouring the player. How do these values arise? 
Prior to the release of the ball, the probability of each number on a balanced roulette wheel can be taken to 
be equal likely, that is 1 in 37 in Europe (and 1 in 38 in the United States). If the house offers odds of 36-for-
1, then the expected value of a unit stake after a single bet on a single number is 36/37.  Raising this to the 
25th power yields the reduction of the initial stake to one half; hence the wealth halving time is, in this case, 
roughly 25 games. 
Roulette is a particularly appropriate analogy in that bets can be placed after the ball has been released.  If, 
using observations taken after the ball is released, one could predict the quarter of the wheel on which the 
ball would land, and if such predictions were correct one third of the time, then one would expect a payoff of 
roughly 36/9 once in every three games. This is comparable with reports of empirical returns averaging 30% 
or the stake doubling time of about 3 noted above. 
There are several important things to note here. First, the odds offered by the house are not fair, even if the 
wheel is.  Specifically, the sum of the implied “probabilities” (the reciprocal of the odds) over the available 
options is not one: 37 * (1/36) > 1.  In practice it is rarely, if ever, the case that this sum is one, although this 
assumption is built in to the most common definition of fair odds7.  
                                                     
6 In each round, the stake is divided across all options, the fraction on each option proportional to the predicted 
probability of that option. Kelly (1956) was in fact interested in interpreting his result in terms of information theory, 
see Epstein (1977). 
7 A typical definition of “fair odds” would be those odds on which one would happily accept either side of the bet; it is 
not clear that this makes sense outside PMS. Operational fair odds should allow the house offering those odds some 
opportunity of remaining solvent even if it does not have access to (non-existent) perfect PDF forecasts. One might 
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Second, ignorance contrasts probability forecasts given only a single realization as the verification. That is, 
of course, the physically relevant situation. In the 1995 Seminar, we discussed the difference between the 
forecast distribution and some “true” distribution as quantified via the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) distance; a 
more elegant measure of the difference between two probability distributions is provided by the relative 
entropy (see Kleeman, 2002). What these and similar approaches fail to grasp, however, is that there is no 
“true” distribution to contrast our forecast distribution with. Outside PMS, our forecast distribution rarely 
even asymptotes to the climatology unless forced to (and if forced, it asymptotes to the sample-climatology). 
In the case of roulette, each spin of the wheel yields a single number. Before the ball is released, a uniform 
prior is arguably fair; but the relevant distribution is defined at the point when all bets must be placed and is 
not uniform. And there’s the rub.  What is a fair distribution at this point? Even if we assume it exists, it 
would depend on the size of your computer, and your knowledge of mechanics, and the details of this 
particular wheel, and this particular ball. And so on. Computing the relative entropy (or the KS distance) 
requires knowledge of both the forecast distribution and the true distribution conditioned on the observations. 
The equation that defines the relative entropy has two terms. The first term reflects the relative frequency 
with which certain forecast probabilities are verified; the second term reflects the relative frequency with 
which certain probabilities are forecast by a perfect model. Thus outside PMS the second term is 
unknowable, and hence the relative entropy is unknowable. The first term reflects the ignorance skill score. 
A shortcoming of ignorance is that it provides only a metric dependent, relative skill score ranking 
alternatives. Its advantage, of course, is that it is deployable in practice. As we have only the data, and data 
are but numbers, only limited skill scores like ignorance are available in practice. 
5.6  Heathrow temperature 
So back to weather roulette: How does the dressed ensemble fare against climatology? Rather well. Consider 
daily bets, each with a stake of £100, placed over the period of a year starting on December 23, 1999. The 
three-day forecast based on the ECMWF ensemble made almost £5000 in this period, while the ten day 
forecast made about £1000 over the same period. As expected even in a perfect model, the value of the 
ensemble relative to climatology decreases with lead-time. And there is more. The dressed ECMWF 
ensemble can also be used to bet against house odds based on the (dressed) ECMWF high-resolution best 
first guess (BFG) forecast. In this case the relative information gain is greater at a lead-time of 10 days than 
at three, with winnings of over £5000 and over £2000, respectively. This also makes sense, inasmuch as the 
value of the ensemble forecast relative to climatology is greatest in the short range, while its value relative to 
a high-resolution forecast is greater at longer lead times (see Roulston and Smith, 2003c for details).  
But there is still more, we can contrast the 51 member ensemble with the 10 member ensemble (all 
ensembles are dressed before use; the best-member kernel will, of course, vary with the size of the 
ensemble); is there statistically significant value added in the 51 member case relative to case of randomly 
selecting 10 members? Yes.  Relative to the 12-member case? Yes. And the 17-member case? No. Arguably, 
if Charles were betting only on Heathrow temperatures he would have done as well dressing 17 members as 
with using (that is, buying) all of them.  He would have taken them for free (why not?) but not paid much for 
them. There is nothing universal about the number 17, in this context. The relevant ensemble size will 
depend on the details of the target variable as well as the model. 
Of course any meteorological sales person worth their salt would immediately point out that users like 
Charlotte are interested in conditional probabilities of multiple variables at multiple locations. Charlotte is 
                                                                                                                                                                                
define fair odds outside PMS as those set by a not-for-profit house aiming only to maintain its endowment while 
providing a risk management resource (Smith, Judd & Clarke, 2003). 
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interested in the efficiency of each of her CCGT plants, as well as some integrated measure of electricity 
demand.  But Charles is happy to stick with Heathrow, as long as his probability forecasts are making him 
money and costing him as little as possible. Making/pricing complicated multi-site derivatives is hard work; 
and he knows that it is dangerous as well: the curse of dimensionality implies tight constraints on the 
conditional probability forecasts that can be pulled out of even the best Monte Carlo ensemble with only a 
few dozen, or a few hundred, members. Charles simply need not take these risks, if the market in trading 
Heathrow temperatures is both sufficiently profitable and sufficiently liquid. Charlotte, on the other hand, is 
exposed to these risks; the best she can do is understand the limits placed on the available forecasts by 
current technology. 
There are three important take home messages here: first that, like it or not, the ideal distribution between 
ensemble size and resolution will be target (that is, user) dependent; second that the marginal value of the 
n+1st ensemble member will go to zero at different times for different uses; and third that the value of the 
EPS as a whole will depend critically upon the provision of an archive that allows users to convert these 
simulations into forecasts of the empirical quantities of interest.  
6. Lies, Damn Lies, and the Perfect Model Scenario 
For the materialist, science is what teaches us what to believe. For the empiricist, 
science is more nearly what teaches us how to give up our beliefs. 
Bas van Fraassen  
Philosophers might call the meteorologist striving for PMS a realist; he believes in the physical reality of the 
model states and in the truth, or approximate truth, of the model. Alternatively, one modern variety of 
empiricist aims only for empirical adequacy. Such labels would be inappropriate here, if they were not 
relevant for the allocation of resources and hence the progress of science.  
A model is empirically adequate if the predictions of the model are in agreement with the observations. In 
this context, the word prediction often refers to prophecies as well as forecasts (see Smith, 1997). To judge 
empirical adequacy requires some accounting for observational noise and the fair use of a projection operator 
between the model variables and the observables; i-shadowing would be a necessary condition for empirical 
adequacy of a dynamical system. There is still much to be understood in this direction, nevertheless it is not 
clear to me that any of our dynamical models are empirically adequate when applied to dynamic (non-
transient) physical systems. There are a number of points, however, where the decision to work within PMS 
impacts the relevance of the statistics used to judge our models and the choice of how to “improve” them. 
6.1  Addressing Model Inadequacy and Multiple Model Ensembles  
The philosophical foundations of theories for objective probability distributions are built about the notion of 
equally likely cases or events (see Giles, 2000). Within PMS, the perfect ensemble is an invocation of this 
ideal for chaotic dynamical systems that are perfectly modelled but imperfectly observed. This view of the 
world is available only to our 21st century demon. Given a collection of good but imperfect models, we might 
try and use them simultaneously to address the issue of model inadequacy. But once we employ multiple 
imperfect models, the epistemological foundations that justify empirical probability forecasting turn to sand. 
While we can tolerate uncertainty in the parameter values of a model that comes from the correct model class 
by invoking what are effectively Bayesian methods, it appears we cannot find an internally consistent 
framework to support objective probability forecasts8 when using multiple models drawn from distinct model 
                                                     
8 A necessary condition for  “objective” as used here is that the forecasts are accountable. This can be tested 
empirically; we have found no dynamic physical system for which accountable forecasts are available. This is a 
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classes the union of which is known to be imperfect. Of course one can draw comfort in those aspects of a 
forecast in which models from each model class independently assign similar probabilities; but only comfort, 
not confidence (see Smith, 2002). Both systematic and flow dependent differences in the skill scores between 
the probability forecasts from each model class may help us identify which physical phenomena deserve the 
most attention in each model class. Thus with time we can improve each of the models in the ensemble, 
while our probability forecasts remain infinitely remote from the accountable forecasts of our 21st century 
demon.  
6.2 Model Inadequacy and Stochastic Parameterizations  
Every attempt at model improvement is an attempt to reduce either parameter uncertainty or model 
inadequacy.  Model inadequacy reflects the fact that there is no model within the class of models available to 
us that will remain consistent with all the data. For example, there may be no set of parameter values that 
enable a current model to shadow the observations out-of-sample9 (or even in-sample?). Finding the (metric 
dependent) “best” parameters, or distributions of parameters, and improving the data assimilation scheme are 
attempts at minimizing the effects of model inadequacy within a given class of models. But model 
inadequacy is that which remains even when the best model within the model class is in hand; it affects both 
stochastic models and deterministic models. 
Historically, physicists have tended to employ deterministic models, and operational numerical weather 
prediction models have been no exception to this trend. There are at least two good reasons why our forecast 
models should be stochastic in theory. The first comes from recent results (Judd and Smith, 2003) which 
establish that, given an imperfect nonlinear chaotic model of a deterministic system, better state estimation 
and better probability forecasts can almost certainly be obtained by using a stochastic model even when the 
system which generated the data really is deterministic! The second is the persuasive argument that, given 
current model resolution, it makes much more sense (physically) to employ stochastic subgrid scale 
parameterisations than to dogmatically employ some mean value, even a good estimate of the expected value 
(Palmer, 2001). And in addition to these theoretical arguments, stochastic parameterisations have been 
shown to be better in practice (Buizza et al., 1999). 
While adopting stochastic parameterisations will make our models fundamentally stochastic it neither 
removes the issue of model inadequacy nor makes our model class perfect. Consider what is perhaps the 
simplest stochastic model for a time series: independent and identically distributed (IID) normal (Gaussian) 
random variables of mean zero and standard deviation one.  Data are numbers.  Any data set has a finite 
(non-zero) probability of coming from this trivial IID model.  Adjusting the mean and the standard deviation 
of the model to equal the observed sample-mean and sample-deviation will make it more difficult to reject 
the null-hypothesis that our IID “model” generated the data, but not much more difficult.  We are soon faced 
with probabilities so low that, following Borel (1950), we could say with certainty that even a stochastic 
model does not shadow the observations. The possibility to resemble differs from the ability to shadow.    
                                                                                                                                                                                
stronger constraint than other useful meanings of objective probabilities; for example that all  “rational men” would 
converge to the same probability forecast given the same observations and background information. Subjective 
probability forecasts can, of course, be obtained quite easily from anyone.  
9 The phrase out-of-sample reflects the situation where the data used in evaluation were not known before the test was 
made, in particular that the data was not used in constructing the model or determining parameters. If the same data was 
used in building the model and testing it, then the test is in-sample. Just as passing an in-sample test  is less significant 
than passing an out-of-sample test, failing an in-sample test is more damning. Note that data are only out-of-sample 
once.   
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One often overlooked point here is that whenever we introduce a stochastic element into our models we also 
introduce an additional constraint: namely that to be a shadowing trajectory, the innovations must be 
consistent with the stochastic process specified in the model.  Stochastic parameterisations may prove a 
tremendous improvement, but they need not yield i-shadowing trajectories even if there exist some series of 
innovations that would produce trajectories similar to a time series of analysis states. To be said to shadow, 
the particular series of innovations must have a reasonable probability given the stochastic process. 
Experience suggests that it makes little difference if we require a 95% isopleth, or 99%, or 99.999% for that 
matter. Model inadequacy manifests itself rather robustly Without this additional constraint the application 
of the concept of i-shadowing to stochastic models would be trivial; the concept would be useless as any 
rescaled IID process could be said to shadow any set of observations. With this constraint, the introduction of 
stochastic terms does not guarantee shadowing, and their contribution to improved probability forecasts can 
be fairly judged. 
Even within PMS we must be careful that any critical, theoretically sound assumptions hold if they are 
relevant in the particular case in question (Gilmour et al. 2001; Hansen and Smith, 2000). Outside PMS a 
model’s inability to shadow holds implications for operational forecasting, and for the Bayesian paradigm in 
applied science, if not in mathematics. First of all, it is demonstrable that we can work profitably with 
imperfect models full of theory-laden (or better still, model-laden10) variables, but we can also be badly 
misled to misallocate resource in the pursuit of interesting mathematics, which assumes an unjustified level 
of perfection in our models.  Ultimately, only observations can adjudicate this argument. Regardless of what 
we “know” must be the case. 
6.3  Dressing Ensemble Forecasts and the so-called Superensemble  
The superensemble method introduced by Krishnamurti et al. (1999) is a very interesting method for 
extracting a single “locally optimised” BFG forecast from a multi-model ensemble forecast. In short, one 
finds the optimal weights (in space, time, and target variable) for re-combining an ensemble of multi-model 
forecasts so as to optimise some root-mean-square skill score of the resulting BFG forecast. 
The localised relative skill statistics generated within the “superensemble” approach must contain a wealth of 
data of value in understanding the shortcomings of each component model and in addressing these model 
inadequacies. Nevertheless the superensemble approach aspires only to form a single BFG forecast, and thus 
it might be more aptly called a  “superensemble-mean” approach. How might we recast the single forecast 
output from the  “superensemble” approach, in order to make a “like with like” comparison between the 
“superensemble” output and a probability forecast? The obvious approach would be to dress it, either with 
some parametric distribution or in the same way we dressed the high-resolution forecasts in section 5 above.  
Hopefully the shortcoming of either approach is clear: by first forming a single superensemble mean, we 
have discarded any information in the original distribution of the individual model states. Alternatively, 
dressing the individual ensemble members retains information from their distribution. So, while it is difficult 
to see how any “superensemble” approach could outperform either a dressing approach or a product space 
method (or any other method which retains the distribution information explicitly), it would be interesting to 
see if in fact there is any relevant information in this distribution!  
                                                     
10 Our theories often involve variables that cannot be fully observed; philosophers would call variables like a 
temperature field theory-laden. Arguably, this temperature field is something rather different from its in silico  
realisation in a particular computational model. Thus the model variables composing, say,  the T42 temperature “field” 
might be called model-laden.   
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6.4 Predicting the relevance of indistinguishable states 
The indistinguishable states approach suggests interesting alternatives both to current methods of ensemble 
formation and to the optimised selection of additional observations. The second are often called adaptive 
observations since the additional observation that is suggested will vary with the current state of the 
atmosphere.  
Ensemble formation via indistinguishable states avoids the problems of adding finite perturbations to the 
current best guess analysis. The idea is to direct computational resources towards maintaining a very large 
ensemble. Rather than discarding ensemble members from the last initialisation they would simply be 
reweighted as more observations are obtained (see also Beven, 2002). It would relax (that is, discard) the 
assumptions of linearized uncertainty growth, for example that the observational uncertainty was small 
relative to the length scale on which the linearisation is relevant (see Hansen and Smith, 2000; Judd, 2003), 
or that the uncertainty distributions are Gaussian. Of course, an indistinguishable states approach assumes 
that near shadowing trajectories of reasonable duration do, in fact, exist. Yet if this assumption fails it is 
difficult to see how the current alternative approaches might function either. Much work remains to be done 
in terms of quantifying state dependent systematic model error (such as drift, discussed by Orrell et al. 2001) 
and detecting systematic differences between the behaviour of the analysis and that of the ensemble and its 
members. 
When required, the ensemble would be reseeded from additional trajectories initiated as far back in time as 
practical, unrealistic perturbations would be identified and discarded without ever being included in a 
forecast.  Reweighting evolved ensemble members given additional data (rather than discarding them), 
allows larger ensembles to be maintained, and becomes more attractive both as the period between 
initialising weather ensembles decreases and in the case of seasonal ensembles where many observations 
may be collected between forecasts launches. In the former case at least, we can form lagged ensemble 
ensemble forecasts (LEEPS) by reweighting (and perhaps changing the kernel of) older ensemble members if 
they either remain relevant in light of the current observations or contribute to the probability forecast at any 
lead-time. Of course, outside PMS the relative weighting and the particular kernel assigned to the elder 
members can differ from that of the younger members, and it would be interesting to use the time at which 
this weighting went to zero in estimating an upper bound for a reasonable maximum forecast lead time.  
Seasonal forecasts as studied within DEMETER (see www.ecmwf.int/demeter) provide ensembles over 
initial conditions and model structure. While it may prove difficult to argue for maintaining multiple models 
within PMS, the need to at least sample some structural uncertainties outside PMS provides an a priori 
justification for multi-model ensembles, as long as the various models are each plausible. Indeed, it is the use 
of a single model structure that can only be justified empirically in this case, presumably on the grounds that, 
given the available alternatives, one model structure is both significantly and consistently better than all the 
others. 
Within PMS, ensembles of indistinguishable states based on shadowing trajectories aims to yield nearly 
accountable probability forecasts, while operational methods based on singular vector or on bred vector 
perturbations do not have this aim, even in theory. It also suggests a more flexible approach to adaptive 
observations if one model simulation (or a set of simulations) was seen to be of particular interest. To 
identify adaptive observations one can simply divide the current trajectories into two groups, one group in 
which each member has the interesting property (for example, a major storm) and the other group in which 
the simulations do not; call these groups red and blue. One could then identify which observations (in space, 
time, and model-variable) are most likely to provide information distinguishing the distribution of red 
trajectories from the distribution of blue, or better said: which observations are most likely to give members 
of one of the groups high probability and those of the other low probability.  As additional regular 
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observations are obtained, the main computational overhead in updating our method is to reweight the 
existing trajectories, a relatively low computational cost and an advantage with respect to alternative 
approaches (see Hansen and Smith, 2001, and references thereof).  
With multi-model forecasts we can also use the indistinguishable states framework to select observations that 
are most likely to falsify one of two models. To paraphrase John Wheeler: Each of our models is false; the 
trick is to falsify them as quickly as possible.  Here only the observations can adjudicate; while what we 
decide to measure is constrained by what we can think of measuring, the measurement obtained is not. Le 
Verrier was as confident of his prediction of Vulcan as he was of his prediction of Neptune, and while both 
were observed for some time only Neptune is with us today. 
Just as the plural of datum is not information, the plural of good idea is not theoretical framework. The 
indistinguishable states approach to forecasting and predictability has significant strengths over competing 
strategies, but its operational relevance faces a number of hurdles that have yet to be cleared. This statement 
should not be taken to indicate that the competition has cleared them cleanly! 
6.5 A short digression toward longer time scales: the in-sample science 
Given the comments made in the earlier talks by Tim Palmer and Myles Allen, we will not resist a short 
digression towards longer time scales.  An operational weather model makes many 7-day forecasts over its 
short lifetime; contrast this case with that of a climate model used to make 50-year forecasts, yet considered 
obsolete within a year or two.  The continuous feedback from making forecasts on new unseen (out-of-
sample) data is largely denied the climate modeller, who is constrained by the nature of the problem to 
forever violate one of the first maxims of undergraduate statistics: never restrict your analysis to in-sample 
statistics. By construction, climate modelling is an in-sample science. And the fundamentally transient nature 
of problem makes it harder still. 
As argued elsewhere (Smith, 2002), an in-sample science requires a different kind of consistency constraint. 
If model inadequacy foils our attempts at objective probability forecasts within the weather scenario, there is 
little if any chance of recovering these in the climate scenario11. We can, however, interpret multiple models 
in a different way. While approaches like best-member dressing can take into account the fact that different 
models will perform better in different conditions in the weather context, a climate modeller cannot exploit 
such observations. In the weather scenario we can use all information available at the time the models are 
launched when interpreting the distribution of model simulations, and as we launch (at least) once a day, we 
can learn from our mistakes. 
Inasmuch as climate forecasting is a transient experiment, we launch only once. It is not clear how one might 
combine a collection of single runs of different climate models into a sensible probability forecast. But by 
studying the in-sample behaviour of ensembles under a variety of models, we can tune each model until an 
ensemble of initial conditions under each and every individual model can at least bound the in-sample 
observations, say from 1950 to 2000.  If ensembles are then run into the future, we can look for the variables 
(space and time scales) on which the individual model ensembles bound the past and agree (in distribution) 
regarding the future.  
Of course agreement does not ensure relevance to the future; our collection of models can share a common 
flaw. But if differences in the subtle details of different models that have similar (plausible) in-sample 
performance are shown to yield significantly different forecast distributions, then no coherent picture 
                                                     
11 I would have said no chance, but Myles Allen argues effectively that climate models might provide information on 
“climate variables” without accurately resolving detailed aspects of the Earth System. 
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emerges from the overall ensemble. Upon adding a new model to this mix, we should not be surprised by a 
major change to the overall forecast distribution. This may still occur even if “each and every one” of the 
current models has similar forecast distributions, but in this case removing (and hopefully, adding) one 
model is less likely to do so. In any event, we can still use these differences in the forecast distributions to 
gain physical insight, and improve each model (individually) using the in-sample data yet again. But as long 
as the details can be shown to matter significantly, we are sunk.  
7. Socio-economic Relevance: Why forecast everyday? 
From a scientific point of view, it is interesting to ask why we make forecasts every day? Why not spend all 
available funds making detailed observations in, say, January, and then spend the rest of the year analysing 
them, using the same computational resources but with a higher resolution model than possible 
operationally? Once we got the physics of the processes for January down pat, we could move on to 
February. And so on. There are a number of reactions to this question, but the most relevant here is the 
simple fact that numerical weather forecasting is more than just a scientific enterprise, real-time forecasting 
is largely motivated by the socio-economic benefits it provides. One of the changes we will see in this 
century is an increase in the direct involvement of users, both in the consideration of their desires and in the 
exploitation of their data sets. Closing this loop can benefit both groups: users will employ forecast products 
more profitably while modellers will have to leave the 500 mb pressure model-height field behind, along 
with the entire model state space, and consider empirically accessible variables.  
Electricity demand provides real-time observations reflecting a number of environmental variables, updated 
on the time scale of a model time step, and spatially integrated over areas similar to model grid spacing. 
Might not assimilating this data (or using it to reweight the trajectories of what were indistinguishable) be 
more likely to yield relevant information than a single thermometer accurate to 16 bits? Charlotte uses 
demand observations every day; she would certainly be willing to sell (or barter) these bits for cheaper (or 
better) forecasts. 
It is easily observed that many talented meteorologists dismiss the idea of a two-way exchange with socio-
economics out of hand. They state, rather bluntly, that meteorologists should stick to the “real science” of 
modelling the atmosphere, even dismissing the comparison of forecast values with observations as mere 
“post-processing”12. Interestingly, if only coincidentally, these same scientists are often those most deeply 
embedded within PMS.  
Of course I do not really care about forecasting today’s electricity demand per se any more than I am 
interested in benthic foraminifera; but I do care very much about empirical adequacy and our ability to 
forecast things we can actually measure: any empirically accessible quantity whatever its origin. I am not 
overly concerned whether a quantity is called “heating degree days” or “temperature”. As long as it 
corresponds to something we can measure, not a model variable, I’ll take as many as I can get.   Probability 
forecasts for both temperature and heating degree days, as well as cumulative heating degree days, are posted 
daily on www.dime.lse.ac.uk  
7.1 Ensembles and Wind Power 
So let us consider two examples of economic meteorology. The first is a study of a hypothetical wind farm 
using real wind data, real forecasts, real electricity prices and a non-existent wind farm just south of Oxford. 
                                                     
12 “Post-what?” one might ask, as a computer simulation is not a forecast until expressed in terms of an observable 
weather variable.  Verification against the analysis may be a necessary evil, but its limitations make it inferior to 
verification against observations. 
236 
SMITH, L.A.: PREDICTABILITY PAST PREDICTABILITY PRESENT 
(Detailed results are available in Roulston et al. 2003.) The economic constraints vary with changes in 
regulation, which occur almost as frequently as changes in an operational weather model. In our study, the 
wind farm must contract for the amount of electricity it will produce in a given half hour a few days in 
advance; it will not be paid for any over production, and will have to supply any shortfall by buying in 
electricity at the spot price on the day.  What we can do in this example is to contrast several different 
schemes for setting the size of the contract, and then evaluate them in terms of the income of our fictional 
wind farm. Contrasting the use of climatology, the dressed ECMWF high-resolution forecast and the dressed 
ECMWF ensemble forecast shows, for instance, that at day four there is a clear advantage in using the 
ensemble. Would Charlotte buy the ECMWF ensemble? That question involves the cost of the ensemble 
relative to its benefits, the cost of the high-resolution run, the size of the current forecast archive and the 
availability of alternative, less expensive probability forecasts. But it is the framework that is important here: 
she can now make an economic choice between probability forecasts, even if some of those probability 
forecasts are based on single BFG model runs (singleton ensembles). As shown in our next example, it is 
likely that in some cases the dressed ensemble forecast may not contain significantly more information than 
the dressed high-resolution forecast. Still, the framework allows us to see when this is the case, and often 
why. Figure 1 shows the daily income from the wind farm: the upper panel uses climatology forecasts, the 
lower panel using the dressed ensemble (for more detail, see Roulston et al. 2003).  The ensemble forecast 
provides increased profit at times of unseasonable strong winds (March 2000) while avoiding loss at times of 
unseasonably weak winds (January 2000). It is not perfect, of course, just better. Presenting the impact of 
weather forecasts in this format allows Charlotte to make her own decisions based on her company’s attitude 
to risk. 
Not perfect, just better.
Obtaining potential profits
 
Avoiding foreseeable losses
Figure 1 The daily income from a hypothetical wind farm based on observed winds, real electricity prices 
and ECMWF forecasts. The upper panel shows the profit when the estimated production use based on 
climatology, the lower panel shows the same when based on the ECMWF ensemble. For more detail, see 
Roulston et al. (2003). 
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7.2 Ensembles and Wave Risk 
Our second example comes from a research project led by Mark Roulston in cooperation with Jerome 
Ellepola of Royal Dutch Shell. Shell is interested in waves at offshore platforms all over the world, both 
fixed rigs (for example, oil well platforms) and floating platforms (Floating Production Storage and 
Offloading Vessels or FPSOVs). The ECMWF ensemble system includes a wave model (Jansen et al. 1997). 
Our aim is to evaluate the relative ignorance both of dressed ensemble forecasts and the dressed high-
resolution forecast. In this case buoy data supplied by Shell provide the target observations and  (out-of-
sample) verification. The results here differ significantly at Bonga, a floating FPSOV off the west coast of 
Africa, and at Draugen, a fixed platform in the North Sea. 
At Bonga, we find no statistically significant advantage in using the ensemble forecasts of significant wave 
height in the frequency bands of interest to Shell, even at day ten. Physically, one might argue that the waves 
arriving at Bonga now tend to have originated far away in space-time: having a good atmospheric forcing in 
day one and two yields a low ignorance wave forecast even at day ten. In that case, the wind that generates 
the relevant waves has already “hit the water” well before the waves reach the FPSOV, suggesting that the 
current forecasts may contain useful information at Bonga well beyond day ten. Alternatively, one might 
argue that the current ECMWF ensemble does not target the tropics, reducing the relevance of the ensemble 
at Bonga, and that doing so would increase the value of the wave ensemble forecast in week one. Either way, 
after checking for statistically insignificant but economically important extreme events, Shell might argue 
that there was no reason to buy more than the dressed BFG for Bonga. Of course, it is also possible that 
increasing the size of the forecast archive might increase the relative skill of the ensemble-based forecast. 
At Draugen the situation is quite different, relatively fast-growing nearby weather events sampled in the 
ensemble result in a significant information advantage for the ensemble wave height forecasts. In the North 
Sea the probability forecasts based on the ensembles have a clear advantage over those from the high-
resolution simulations. These results suggest that significant thought should go into setting the price structure 
for BFG based probability forecasts and EPS based forecasts (and yet other multi-model options which dress 
the union of BFG and EPS simulations).  Such issues are relevant to the economics of forecasting, if not 
economic forecasts; Charlotte is interested in both. 
8. So what is “Uncertainty in initial condition”, really?  
This may seem a trivial question. The standard answer to this trivial question would be the equation: 
 e = x – X 
Where e is the uncertainty in the initial condition, x is the model state we used at t=0, and X is the true state 
of the real system at time t=0. There is a small difficulty here. Perhaps unexpectedly it is with the symbol  
“-”, which is undefined as when contrasting apples and oranges, making our one equation ill-posed. While x 
sits in our model-state space, without doubt one large integer in this digital age, X is, at best, the true state of 
the atmosphere. These vectors, if they both exist, exist in different spaces even if we confuse model-
temperature with temperature (see Smith, 1997).  There is an easy mathematical way out here, simply 
replacing X with P(X) where P is some projection operator which takes the true state space into our model-
state space (this is touched upon in Smith 2001, Orrell et al. 2001 and Judd and Smith, 2003). Introducing 
the projection operator shifts the ambiguity in the minus sign to the projection operator, P. It is not clear that 
we can nail down P beyond simply saying that it is many-to-many, which may prove more troubling than it 
seems at first. 
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The main difficulty in interpreting this equation, however, is of a different sort: if there is no model state that 
shadows the time series of each consecutive analysis to within the observational uncertainty, then the 
shortcomings of the forecast simply cannot be attributed to uncertainty in the initial condition. Why? 
Because in this case, there was no model initial condition to be uncertain of. It was not that we did not know 
which value of x to use, but that there was no value of x which would have given a correct forecast. There is 
no clear definition of uncertainty in the initial condition outside the perfect model scenario. 
Both the projection operator and tests of empirical adequacy are bound up with the definition of 
observational “noise”, while the identification of shadowing trajectories requires projecting observational 
noise into the model state space. Although most scientists believe that they can recognise it when they see it, 
much remains to be said about the concept of noise. 
Turning to a more practical matter: how might we proceed in practice other than by developing the best 
model structure our technology can support, inserting physically motivated parameterisations with 
empirically estimated parameter values, insisting that water freeze at exactly zero degrees, and trusting that 
in time our model will slowly approach Truth? 
There is an alternative. Its implications are not yet clear, but if I am lucky enough to be invited to 
Predictability 2009 then I may be able to give more details at that time. The alternative is to embrace model 
inadequacy while relinquishing the 21st century Laplacian dream of accountable probability forecasts. To 
adopt instead a goal which is less attractive but conceivably attainable: using ensembles of initial conditions 
evolved under a collection of imperfect models, aiming to say as much as is justified by our models. We 
should expect our forecasts to be blatantly wrong as rarely as possible, but not less rarely than possible.   
9. Conclusions and Prospects 
Predictability present: There is no doubt that the current operational ensemble systems have value beyond 
that recognised in industry; this is an opportunity. The question should be seen as one of how to exploit this 
information content, not as to whether or not it “exists”. Each of our three users can base better economic 
decisions and reduce their exposure to weather risk by using probability forecasts based on existing ensemble 
prediction systems. This is not to say that current probability forecasts are accountable, but rather that they 
are valuable. Charlie, who deals for the most part with binary decisions, can determine the ideal probability 
thresholds at which he should act and interpret forecasts more profitably.  Charles can translate the forecast 
probabilities both to better gauge the likely behaviour of weather derivatives in the near term, and to extract 
the likely impact of weather on the futures markets. While Charlotte, our most numerate user, can 
incorporate probabilistic weather forecasts in a variety of applications from hours to weeks, with the aim of 
including probabilistic weather information to allow seamless forward planning for weather impacts. Current 
ensemble prediction systems have demonstrable economic value.  
Two obvious questions arise. First, what can be done to raise the level of exploitation of these forecasts? And 
second, how can we best move forward to increase their value? The answer to the first question involves 
education, technology transfer, and both the production and advertisement of case studies illustrating the 
value of current forecast products in realistic economic examples. Answering the question of how best to 
move forward would, no doubt, benefit from a better understanding of what constitutes the notion of 
“forward,” but the improvement of forecast models and their associated data assimilation, the improved 
generation and retention of members in initial condition ensembles, the wider use of multi-model ensembles 
and improved methods for translating ensembles of simulations into weather forecasts will each play a role. 
Almost a century ago, L.F. Richardson began the first numerical weather forecast by hand, while envisioning 
the use of parallel computing in numerical weather forecasting. Today, the electronic computer plays two 
rather distinct roles in physical science. First it allows us to calculate approximate solutions to a wide variety 
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of equations at speeds Richardson could only dream of. Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, it 
allows us to record and access data that, in turn, reveal just how imperfect our models are. Having accepted 
that probability forecasts are here to stay, it will be interesting to see when it proves profitable to shift from 
trying to make our model perfect towards trying to make our forecasts better. Accepting that our best 
dynamical models are not and never need be empirically adequate will open new avenues toward 
understanding the physics of the Earth System, and may allow us to achieve predictability past the 
limitations we face at present. 
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